Urban property taxation in developing countries by Dillinger, William
PolEoy,  Planning,  and PRmew'oh
VVORKiNG  PAPERS
World  Deve.opnwnt  Repoil
OffleI  of  the  Vice  President
Development  Economics
The  World  Bank
August  1988
WPS  41
Background  Paper  for  the  1988  World  Development  Report
Urban Property  Taxation
in Developing  Countries
William  Dillinger
The property  tax can be an efficient,  equitable  means  of fmanc-
ing municipal  services in developing  countries,  but in most
countries  it needs  reform.
The Policy, Planning, and Research  CompleA  distributes PPR Wodking  Papers  to dissentinate  the findigs  of wa  i  progres  a  nd to
encourage the exchange of ideas amng Bank  staff and  all othen  inteaeted in development isues.  Thewe  papers cay  the nam  of
the  authors, reflect only their  views, and  should be used and  cited  accordingly.  The findings, interpeatias,  and  conclusionsx  aethe
















































































































dP  P  lan,Pning, and R  8om
World  Dovwlpmont  Report 
The property tax is the most widely used source  Administrative reforms should support
of municipal tax revenue in the developing  simple procedures for property discovery and
world, but its current yield is often insubstantial.  valuation, suited to the characteristics of the
local tax base and the skills to the taxing author-
Poor policy often sets tax rates too low,  ity.  Procedures for updating property records to
offers excessive exemptions, and fails to ade-  reflect changes in the tax base deserve particular
quately respond to inflation.  Poor administra-  attention.  Collection systems should be de-
tion results in incomplete tax rolls, haphazard  signed to make compliance convenient; and
valuations, and low collection efficiency.  noncompliance subject to costly, swift, and sure
penalties.
To increase the yield and improve the
fairness of the tax, both the policy and adminis-  Central governments can achieve reform on
trative problems must be addressed. Tax reform  a nationwide scale - even where the property
too often consists of a one-time general revalu-  tax is locally administered  -by  delivering
ation or rate increase. Taken alone, neither has a  standardi?ed packages of training and technical
sustained impact on the property' tax's perform-  assistance to local governments.
ance.
This paper is a background paper for the
Tax policy must ensure that rates are set  1988 World Development Report.  Copies are
high enough to make the tax worth collecting.  available free from the World Bank, 1818 H
Where significant inflation exists, a policy of  Street NW, Washington, DC 20433. Please
annual adjustments in rates or valuations should  contact Rhoda Blade-Charest, room S13-060,
be instituted.  extension 33754.
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I.  INTRODUCTION
The property  tax is the  most widely  used municipal  revenue
source  in the  developing  world.  Tn almost  all LDC's  with large  urban
populations,  some form of property  tax is assigned  to the support  of
local  governmeuts."  Confronting  continued  rapid  urban  growth,  local
authorities  are  under  pressure  to,  at  minimum,  maintain  a constant  level
of property  tax  revenues  in real  per  capita  terms. Efforts  to  increase
expenditures  on municipal  services  frequentl/  look to the  F-  -ty tax
as a promising  source  of additional  revenue.  Thip has ot_.u droven
difficult to  achieve.  Misguided policy and  poor  administration
constrain  the  yields  of the  urban  property  tax  in  many  LDC's.
This paper has two objectives. The first  is to assess  the
policy  arguments  for  the use of property  taxes  as a municipal  revenue
source.  The second  is to review  the  revenue  performance  of property
taxation  and  define  practical  ways  to improve  it.
For purposes  of this  paper,  the property  tax is defined  as a
recurrent  tax on real property  (land and/or improvements)  in urban
areas. As such,  the  property  tax  is only  one  of several  forms  of  real-
property-related  taxation.  Others  include  taxes  on  property
1/  Among  the  50 largest  LDC  metropolitan  areas,  only  those  in rraq,
Viet Nam, and China  (which  is presently  considering  a property
tax) do  not  receive revenues from an  urbap property tax.
Property taxes  also contribute to  the  support of  central
governments  in  some  smaller  LDC's.- 2 -
transactions  and inheritance,  and taxes  on rural real property. The
latter  forms  of taxation  are  generally  assigned  to  central  or prov,ncial
governments  and constitute  a small  part of their  revenues. The  urban
property  tax, in contrast,  is normally  assigned  to local  governments,
and  constitutes  a relatively  large  proportion  of their  resources.
A.  The  Role  of  Urban  Property  Taxation  in  LDCs
The  extent to  which local governments  rely on  property
taxation  varies  among countries. Measured  as a percent  of local  tax
revenues, property taxes' contribution  (measured  at  the  level of
national  aggregates)  varies  from  eight  percent  in  Pakistan  to  9g percent
in Kenya. As a  general  rule,  property  taxes  can,  nevertheless,  be said
to constitute  a plurality,  if not a majority,  of the municipal  tax
revenues  in  most  LDC's.  As shown  in Table  1, property  taxes  constitute
40 to  50 percent  of aggregate  municipal  tax  revenues  in four  of the  most
populous  LDC's--India,  Brazil,  Indonesia,  and  Mexico. Although  greater
variation  exists at the level of individual  cities, the extent of
property  tax reliance in major metropolitan  cities generally  falls
within  the  range  of 30 to  80 percent.
Measured as  a  percentage of  total  municipal recurrent
revenues,  property  taxes'  contribution  is much smaller. The share  of
total  municipal  revenues  contributed  by property  taxation  is less than
25 percent  in  nine  of the  eleven  countries  shown  in  Table  1,  and  is less
than  ten  percent  in four  of them.  Similar  proportions  are  exhibited  in
the  case  of individual  cities.-3-
Table  1:  EXTENT  OF MUNICIPAL  RELIANCE  ON PROPERTY  TAXATION
Property  Taxes  as Z of:  Property  Taxes  as  Z  oft
Country/  Taxes  Total  Country/  Taxes  Total
City  Revenues  City  Revenues
INDIA  40%  24%  BRAZIL  401  81
Bombay  221  171  Sao  Paulo  38Z  16X
Calcutta  921  361  Rio  de  Janeiro  31Z  121
Madras  821  411
COLOMBIA  46Z  61
INDONESIA  431  121  Bogota  32Z  18X
Jakarta  101  51
MEXICO  552  12Z
KOREA  271  191  Mexico  (DF)  59Z  61
Seoul  21Z  181
PERU  NA  NA
PAKISTAN  81  61  Lima  571  171
Karachi  131  121
Lahoee  13Z  121  TUNISIA  281  91
Tunis  NA  141
PHILIPPINES  701  201
Manila  591  361  NrCERIA  NA  NA
Lagos  701  221
lbadan  131  31
KENYA  991  361
Nairobi  921  361
Median
COUNTRIES  421  121
Cities  35Z  17%
The property  tax's  relatively  small  role  in the financing  of
municipal services is  partly explained by  the  central government
*policies  concerning  the  structure  of local  government  finance. Central
governments'  tax  assignment  policies  reduce  the  need  for  heavy  reliance
on property  taxation. Where  central  governments  assign  a second,  broad-
based  tax  instrument  to  local  authorities,  the  property  tax's  share  of-4-
total t.x revenue  is relatively  small.  Thus property  taxes'  small
contribution to  municipal taz  revenues in  Brazil reflec'  the
availability  of a  municipal  services  tax.  In Colombia,  a municipal  tax
on industry  and commerce  plays  this role;  in Pakistan,  an octroi2l  does
so.  Within  India,  B!rbay's  low  reliance  on property  taxation  reflects
the  availability  cf  'i  octroi;  Calcutta's  and  Madras'  heavy  reliance  on
property  taxation  reflects  the  absence  of a supplementary  tax  instrument
in their  respective  states.
Similarly,  the  availability  of non-tax  revenue  sources  reduces
the need for strong  property  tax  effort.  Intergovernmental  recurrent
transfers constitute the  largest source of  municipal revenues in
Indonesia,  the Philippines,  and all the  Latin  American  countries  shown
in Table 1, far exceeding  the contribution  of property  taxation. In
Kenya,  local  reliance  on fees  and  user  charges  reduces  the  contribution
of  property  taxation  to total  revenues.
In many LDC's,  central  governments  also directly  limit the
yields  of property  taxes by placing  limits  on assessment  ratios  and
maximum  tax rates,  mandating  genprous  exemption  policies,  and delaying
or cancelling  general  revaluations. In the Philippines,  for example,
the combined  effect  of central  government  limitations  on assessment
ratios  and tax rates  and centrally  decreed  postponements  of a general
revaluation  is  an  effective  tax  on  urban  land  of  roughly  0.2  percent.
Political  vulnerability  is also a significant  constraint  on
property  tax  yields. In  practice,  the  property  tax  suffers  from  a
-----------------------------------
2/  The  octroi  is  a form  of import  tax,  imposed  on  goods  entering  the
municipality.- 5  -
degree  of  political  resistance  that  is  disproportionate  to  its  absolute
yields.  This  is  due  to  two  characteristics  of  the  tax:
Large  number  of statutory  tazpayers. The tax bases  that
support  central  government  typically  involve  relatively  small  numbers  of
taxpayers.  Personal  income  taxes,  in  developing  countries,  generally
reach  only  the  small  proportion  of  the  labor  force  engaged  in  relatively
high paying  formal  sector  activity. The various  forms  of indirect
taxes--on  imports,  domestic  manufacturing,  and  wholesale  distribution--
directly  affect  only the firms  engaged  in these  activities.3i  The
statutory  base  of  property  taxation  in  contrast,  consists  of  all  owners
(and in some cases,  all occupants)  of property.  The political
consequences  of  an  increase  in  property  taxes  are  more  widely  felt  that
an  increase  in  central  taxes.
"Non-objective"  basis  of  assessment.  Unlike  income  or  sales
taxes,  property  tax calculations  are not  based  on actual  accounting
flows,  but  rather  on  eatimates  of  stock  value  (or  an  equally  presumptive
estimate  of rental  income). The procedures  used to derive  these
estimates  are perceived  by taxpayers  as arbitrary  and unrelated  to
ability  to pay.  This  is particularly  true  during  periods  of rapid
inflation  and  recession,  when  property  values  may  rise  more  rapidly  than
incomes. Government  efforts  to adjust  valuations  for  inflation  are
perceived  as  increasing  the  tax  burden  unjustly.  The  consequences  of
3/  While  part  of the incidence  of indirect  taxes  is ultimately
shifted  forward  onto consumers  at large,  this incidence  is
disguised  in the form  of higher  prices  and is not generally
perceived  by  taxpayers.-6-
this  attitude  are  illustrated  in  Table  2.  As  shown,  real  declines  in
property tax  revenues were  c!aracteristic  of  all  the  countries
experiencing  recession  and moderate to high inflation  in the early
1980's.  Significant  growth  in real terms  was characteristic  only of
countries  with  low  to  moderate  inflation  and  growing  economies.
The combined  effect  of central  revenue  assignment  policies,
and the political  vulnerability  of property  taxation  is a often a
situation  characterized  by low absolute  levels  of property  taxation,
haphazard  tax  administration,  and  persistent efforts by  local
authorities  to increase  the  transfer  of resources  from  higher  levels  of
government.
B.  The  Economic  Case  for  Property  Taxation
As a device for financing  the recurrent  cost of municipal
services, the  merits  of  the  property  tax  are  controversial.
Conventional  analysis  concludes  that  a tax  on urban  land is  neutral  in
its impact on resource  allocation,  and probably  progressive  in its
incidence.  A tax  on  buildings,  however,  is  believed  to  be  distortionary
in its impact  on  resource  allocation,  and (under some conditions)
regressive  in its  incidence.
Tho conventional  framework  may overstate  the impact  of an
urban  property  tax,  however.  To the extent  that  service  benefits  are
correlated  with  property  values, the tax's adverse allocative  and
distributional  effects  may  be  mitigated.-7-
1.  Impacts  on  Efficiency  and  Equity:  Conventional  View
To determine  the alLocative  and distributional  impact  of a
given tax, it is  necessary  first to assess  the statutory  taApayers'
response to  its  introduction,  and  how  much of  its  incidence is
ultimately  passed  on  to other  groups  in  the  economy: owners  of land  and
capital,  renters,  consumers,  and  labor. The  extent  and  pattern  of their
response  determines  the  impact  of the  tax  on the  efficiency  of  resource
allocation.  The position  each of these  groups  in the country's  income
distribution  determines  the  tax's  distributional  impact.
Table  2:  THE  IMPACT  OF INFLATION  AND  RECESSION  ON PROPERTY  TAX  REVENUES
Average  Annual  Percenta&e  Chanse  In:
Country  Time  Revenue  CPI  Revenue  CDP  Buoyancy
Period  (nominal)  (real)  (real)
Indonesia  80 - 84  222  llZ  10X  6%  42
Korea  81 - 83  162  6Z  10%  8X  22
Philippines  81 - 85  9%  222  -11%  -32  -8%
Bolivia  80 - 84  110X  2522  -40%  4%  -432
Brazil  80 - 84  1142  1332  -8%  1%  -92
Chile  80 - 84  2%  192  -14%  -3X  -11l
Colombia  80  - 84  1%  22%  -17%  3%  -19%
Mexico  80 - 84  52Z  61%  -6Z  0%  -6%
Tunisia  81 - 84  3X  10%  -6%  4%  -10%
Kenya  81 - 84  15%  14%  1%  -2Z  3%
Zimbabwe  80 - 83  242  15%  7%  5%  2%
* Percentage  change  in  revenues,  deflated  by  percentage  change  in
nominal  CDPProperty  Tax  Buoyancy
OIKorea  I?mbabw
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Traditionak.  analysis  assumes  that,  prior  to imposition  of the
tax,  all factors  are allocated  in the  most efficient  possible  pattern.
Imposition  of the tax  interferes  with this allocation  by changing
relative  prices  and rates  of return.41 The goal  of tax policy,  under
this framework,  is to interfere  with the allocation  of resources  as
little as  possible; to  finance the  public sector using neutral
instruments  which  elicit  the  smallest  possible  avoidance  response.
4/  Taxation  also distorts  resource  allocation  through  its  impact  on
sector  incomes. The  reduction  in  income  resulting  from  the  shift
in resources  from the private  to the  public  sector  changes  the
pattern  of aggregate  demand,  further  removing  the  allocation  of
resource  from  its  pre-tax  position.-9-
In the short  term, the statutory  and economic  incidence  of
introducing  or increasing5/  the property  tax are identical. Because
owrers  of land  and buildings  cannot  immediately  reduc!e  their  supply,  a
tax  on land  and  buildings  cannot  be shifted  forward  (unless  permitted  by
law or contract). Thus in the short  term,  an increase  in the  property
tax has no impact on resource  allocation.  If owners  of land and
buildings  are assumed  to be disproportionately  represented  in higher
income  groups,  the  short  ter-m  distributional  impact  of the  property  tax
is progressive.
In the long term, the supply  of buildings  can be reduced.
Owners of  buildings can  respond to a  tax  increase  by  curtailing
investment  in new structures,  rehabiiitation,  and maintenance.  The
resulting  shrinkage  in supply  of buildings  may cause  prices  to rise,
shifting  part of the burden  of the tax  onto  users  of these  structures
(e.g.,  households  and  businesses).
As long  as the  tax increase  is confined  to  a small  number  of
jurisdictions,  the response  of building-owners  would enable them to
avo.d  much  of the  long  term  incidence  of the  tax. Building-owners  would
be expected to shift capital that would otherwise  be  invested  in
buildings  into other  forms  of investment. This disinvestment  in the
taxed  cities  woult  continue  until  the  rate  of return  on  new  construction
in the  taxed  cities  equalled  the  return  on alternative  investments.  As
long  as the  capital  stock  in the  taxed  cities  was relatively  small,  the
S/  Because  most  countries  already  have  a property  tax  in place,  this
discussion  assesses  the  impact  of  an increase  in  the  property  tax
level  (with  a  corresponding  increase  in  public  expenditure).10  -
rate  of return  to capital  in the  country  am a whole  would  be unaffected
by the imposition  of the tax.  Owners  of buildings  in the taxed  city
would  thus  be  able  to reallocate  their  resources  with  no loss  in  rate  of
return.
If  the  tax  increase  were  nationwide  in scope,  the  distribution
of its incidence  would  be more complex. A large  scale  reallocation  of
capital from taxable  structures  to other forms of investment  would
reduce  the rate  of return  to capital  in the  country  as a whole.  This
would  shift  part  of the incidence  of the  tax  onto  owners  of capital  in
all  forms,  throughout  the  country.6/
In  the long  term,  a tax  on buildings  is therefore  not  neutral
with  respect  to the  allocation  of resources.  Over time,  it  will induce
a reallocation  of resources  from taxable  structures  to  other  forms  of
capital  investment.  In its  distributional  impact,  a single-city  tax  on
buildings  may be regressive,  if the  elasticity  of expenditure  on
housing  with respect  to income  is assumed  to be less  than  one.  If the
tax increase  is of national  scale,  this  may be partly  offset  by the
…----------------------------------
6/  Not  all  of this  incidence  will  necessarily  be borne  by owners  of
capital,  however.  The reduction  in rates  of return  to capital
may prompt  producers  to substitute  labor for  capital;  reducing
the  marginal  product  of labor,  resulting  in  a  drop  in  wages. The
burden  of an increase  in property  taxes  of national  significance
may therefore  be shared  among owners  of land,  and labor and
owners  of  capital  in  the  country,  as a  whole.
This  argument  assumes  that  the  supply  of capital  is fixed  in  the
country  as a  whole.  Citing  the importance  of international
capital flows in smaller  developing  countries,  Bahl and Linn
argue that capital  may flow  out of a country  in response  to a
lowered  rate of return.  An increase  in property  taxation  of
nationwide  significance  could therefore  prompt an outflow of
capital,  reducing,  inter  alia,  investment  in  housing  and  shifting
part  of the  burden  onto  renters  throughout  the  country.- 11  -
absorption  of part of the  tax  burden  by owners  of capital,  who  may be
assumed  to  be  disproportionately  represented in  higher  income
brackets.
This discussion  applies  only to the portion  of the property
tax that falls on buildings.  Conventional  analysis  holds that the
incidence  of the land portion  of the property  tax cannot  be shifted.
Unlike  buildings,  land  is  fixed  in  supply. Given  a fixed  supply  of land
(and no  change in users' estimation  of its value) the price that
landowners  can charge for its use will be unaffected  by the tax.
Landowners  will therefore  be forced  to bear the full  incidence  of the
tax themselves. Landowners  could  not escape  the tax  by selling  their
property,  as market  prices  would  decline  to reflect  future  property  tax
liabilities.
The land portion  of the property  tax is,  therefore,  neutral
with  respect  to the  allocation  of resources.  Imposing  the  tax  will  not,
according to  conventional  assumptions, induce a  reallocation  of
resources  to other  forms  of investment.  In terms  of its  distributional
impact, the  land  component of  the  property tax  is  presumably
progressive, if  landowners are  assumed to  be  disproportionately
represented  in  higher  income  brackets.
2.  The  Influence  of  Tax-Financed  Benefits
Conventional  analysis  probably  overstates  the  allocative  and
distributional  impacts  of the  property  tax. Because  the  property  tax  is
a local  tax,  the  benefits  of the  services  it finances  remain  within  the
taxing jurisdiction. These benefits  will influence  the response  of
property  owners  to  the  imposition  of the  tax.- 12  -
An  increase in the property tax on  rented housing,  for
example,  may be used to finance  an  increase  in services  to their
occupants. Increased  services  would,  in  turn,  increase  the  willingness
of tenants  to pay higher  rents.  By increasing  rents,  building-owners
would  be able to partially  restore  their  rates  of return  to the  levels
prevailing  before  the  imposition  of the  tax. Builtding-owners  would  thus
have  less  inducement to  shift their capital to  other  forms of
investment;  and the impact  of the tax on the allocation  of resources
would  be  diminished.
The benefits  of tax-financed  services  would be reflected  in
the  sales  price  of property. Prices  would  rise  to reflect  the  expected
benefits  of  future tax-financed  services.  This capitalization  of
benefits could offset the  capitalization  of  tax  liabilities  into
property  values. The land  portion  of the  property  tax  may therefore  not
have the  progressive  incidence  suggested  by conventional  analysis.
Landowners  may be no worse  off after the imposition  of the tax than
before  it.
The  extent to  which  tax-financed  services diminish the
allocative  and d.stributional  impacts  of the  property  tax  depends  upon
how closely  tax-costs  and service-benefits  are  correlated  at the  level
of individual  properties. If benefits,  as perceived  by the market,
exactly equal  liabilities,  the  property tax  (both on  land  and
improvements)  would be  neutral with respect to  the allocation  of
resources,  and would  have no "incidence"  to impose  on various  income
groups.- 13  -
The likelihood  of a perfect  correspondence  between  costs  and
benefits  is,  however,  remote. Even if the  overall  level  of services  in
a  given locality  is satisfactory  to its taxpayers,  the use of the
property  tax  to finance  these  services  will  confer  net  benefits  on some
property  owners  and net costs  on others. The statutory  burden  of the
property  tax is, by definition,  distributed  according  to the  value  of
property. The  benefits  of tax-financed  services  are not.  The  benefits
of municipal  road maintenance  or refuse  collection  are, for example,
more c -sely  proportional  to household  size (reflecting  the number  of
beneficiaries)  than to property  value.  Only such services  as fire
protection  and protection  against vandalism  could be considered  to
confer  benefits  roughly  proportional  to  property  values.
This does not argue against the use of property  taxes to
finance  the costs  of municipal  services. As discussed  below,  service
benefits  are  more  closely  correlated  with  property  values  than  with  most
other tax bases.71  It does, however,  argue for adopting  valuation
methods  that reflect  variations  in the  benefits  provided  to different
properties.  Such methods are  already used  in  some  developing
countries.  Brazilian  municipalities,  for  example,  impose  a variety  of
property  tax surcharges  for solid  waste  management,  street  maintenance
and  similar services.  These  surcharges are  imposed only  in
neighborhoods  where  these  services  are  actually  provided.
7/  This is particularly  true of the national  tax bases  that fund
intergovernmental  transfers. Such transfers  can  unintentionally
shift  the  cost  of financing  services  to taxpayers  in  an entirely
different  jurisdiction.- 14  -
3.  Conclusion:  Comparison  to  the  Alternatives
Judged  on efficiency  and equity  criteria,  the property  tax
appears  to be an acceptable  means to finance  municipal  services. The
conventional  view finds  the land component  of the  property  tax to be
allocatively  neutral and probably  progressive.  While it finds the
capital  component  of the tax distortionary  (and probably  regressive)
these  qualities  are  diminished,  to the  extent  that  service  benefits  are
correlated  with  property  values.
The property  tax  ranks  particularly  well  when  compared  to the
alternatives.  In theory,  the recurrera,.  costs of municipal  services
could be  financed through a  variety of  user charges, taxes, or
intergovernmental  transfers.  Among these instruments,  user charges
would  rank  highest  on  efficiency  grounds,  as they  can  serve  as a pricing
mechanism  for  efficiently  rationing  individual  consumption  of municipal
services. The scope  for user charges  is limited  however.  The "public
goods" nature of most municipal services  requires  they be consumed
collectively.
Most  forms  of intergovernmental  transfers  would  rank  below  the
property tax  on  efficiency grounds.  Transfers typically entail
extensive  subsidies  between  the taxpayers  of different  jurisdictions:
the  taxpayers  of some  jurisdictions  pay  more  in  central  taxes  than  their
local  governments  receive  in transfers;  other taxpayers  pay less and
while their  local  governments  receive  more.  These  implicit  subsidies
distort  the  allocation  of  resources  between  the  production  of  municipal- 15  -
services  and  all  other  production.-e  Such  subsidies  are  difficult  to
eliminote,  even  where  governments  wish  to do so.  In LDC's,  central
governments  rely  heavily  on indirect  forms  of taxation. While  the
statutory  origin  of  such  taxes  can  be  identified,  the  location  of  their
economic  incidence  cannot. Transfer  formulas  are  therefore  unable  to
remove  interjurisdictional  subsidies  by "returning"  central  taxes  to
their  true  origin.
The  property  tax  does  not  necessarily  rank  first  on  efficiency
grounds  when  cornared  to other  taxes. Under  conventional  incidence
assun  tions,  most  forms  of  payroll  and  personal  income  taxation  would
rank  equally  well,  and  flat  "head"  taxes  would  rank  higher. Retail
sales  taxes  would  also  rank  well,  provided  consumers  confined  their
purchasing  to  their  jurisdiction  of  residence.91
In  practice, these  alternatives  are  not  always
administratively  or politically  attractive.  Head  taxes  are  not  cost
effective  under  most  LDC  conditions.  Personal  income  taxes  reach  too
small  a  proportion  of  the  population  to  provide  a  sufficiently  broad  tax
-----------------------------------
8/  Bahl  and  Linn  (Ref.  1)  argue  that  some  forms  of  intergovernmental
transfers  can  improve  the  efficiency  of  resource  allocation,  by
correcting  the  "prices"  faced  by  municipal  authorities.  Where  a
local  government's  expenditures  on a particular  service  yield
benefits  to other  jurisdictions,  it will (from  a nation-wide
standpoint)  underallocate  resources  to that  service  unless  its
expenditures  on the service  are subsidized. This specific
instance  does  not  diminish  the  validity  of  the  general  conclusion
referred  to  in  the  text.
9/  Otherwise  the  tax  would  result  in  the  same  cross-jurisdictional
subsidies  as  intergovernmental  transfers  funded  from  indirect
taxes.- 16  -
base  in smaller  towns. Both  personal  income  and  retail  sales  taxes  pose
problems  of tax  competition  with  higher  levels  of government.-0/
In  contrast,  the  urban  property  tax  is--at  least  potentially--
cost  effective;  its base is sufficiently  distributed  geographically  to
provide  even small towns  with a source  of revenues;  and it poses  no
direct  competition  with the tax bases preferred  by higher  levels  of
government.
II.  PROPERTY  TAX  REFORM:  TARGETS  FOR  INTERVENTION
Efforts  to improve  the performance  of urban property  taxes
have two targets  for intervention:  policy  and administration. Policy
decisions--low  tax rates,  broad  exemptions,  infrequent  adjustments  for
inflation--reduce  the statutory  level of  the  property tax.  Poor
administration--incomplete  tax  rolls,  haphazard  valuations, low
collection  efficiency--reduce  the  proportion  of the  statutory  base that
is  effectively  taxed, and  introduce  arbitrariness  into the  tax's
incidence.
10/  This  is  not  an  insuperable  problem, at  least in  developed
countries.  In Japan  and most of Western  Europe  (excluding  the
U.K.),  income  and local  sales  taxes--not  property  taxes--are  the
primary  source  of local  government  tax  revenue.- 17  -
Reform  effort  must  address  both  targets.  While  policy  actions
offer the prospect  of quick revenue  increases,  taken alone they
exaggerate  the  inequities  in the  tax's  incidence.  A rise  in  the  tax
rate,  for example,  places  the burden  of the increase  on those  few
individuals  whose  properties  are  on the  rolls  and  are  accurately  valued,
and  from  whom  taxes  are  actually  collected.
Improvements  in  administrition  offer the  prospect  of
increasing  yields by  improving  equity.  Improvements  in  the
comprehensiveness  of  tax  rolls,  the  objectivity  of  valuations,  and  the
efficiency  of  collections  increase  revenues  by  increasing  the  burden  on
those  who  presently  underpay.  Taken  alone,  however,  such  administrative
improvements  may not be worthwhile.  If tax  rates  remain  low,  the
absolute  level of property  taxes  may be  trivial.  Under these
conditions,  the  property  ta-,  although  equitably  administered,  may  not
produce  enough  revenue  to  be  worth  collecting.
A. Property  Tax  Policy
Many  governments  in  developing  countries  attempt  to  use  the
property  tax to achieve  objectives  other than the generation  of
revenue.  Some of these  objectives  are allocative: encouraging
intensive  development  of urban  land,  encouraging  home-ownership,  or
attracting  new  industry.  Some  are  distributional:  attempting  to  shift
the  burden  of taxation  onto  higher  income  groups  in  their  capacity  as
property  owners  or  businessmen,  and  to  shift  the  burden  off  the  poor.
The  policy  tools  used  to  achieve  these  objectives  are  three:
the  definition  of  the  tax  base;  the  rate  structure,  and  the  structure  of- 18  -
exemptions.  As discussed  below,  the  use  of these  tools  to achieve  non-
revenue objectives  is,  in general, not  good practice.  They are
generally  not  effective,  and  can  be costly  in terms  of foregone  revenue.
1. Defining  the  Base
Land  or  Land  and  Improvements
The  base  of the  recurrent  urban  property  tax  can  be  defined  in
one of two basic  ways.  (i)  unimproved  site  value;  where  only land  is
taxed,  and (ii)  improved  site  valtue,  where  bo.h land and improvements
are taxed.  The  base of the  unimproved  site  value  definition  generally
includes  both  vacant  land  and land  that is built  upon.  The difference
between the cwo systems is therefore  only whether improvements  are
included  in  the  base.ii/
The case for taxing  only land rests largely  on allocative
considerations. Because  land is inelastic  in supply  (under  orthodox
assumptions),  imposing  a  tax on  land does not  interfere  with the
allocation  of  resources.  A tax  on improvements,  in  contrast,  would  lead
in the long run to a reallocation  of capital  to untaxed  sectors  and
locations.  Allocative  neutrality  can  thus  only  be achieved  by  confining
the  property  tax  base  to  land.
If (as  argued  earlier)  the  benefits  of a property  tax offset
their costs, the efficiency  argument  against taxing improvements  no
longer  holds. To the  extent  the  owners  of capital  suffer  no net
II/  Other  variants  exist  but are relatively  rare.  Some countries
(notably in Africa) tax  only  improved  property (land and
improvements),  exempting  vacant  land.- 19  -
reduction  in  their  rate  of  return  as  a  result  of  the  imposition  of  the
tax,  no reallocation  of  capital  will  occur,  and  the  tax  will  induce  no
distortion  in  the  allocation  of  resources.  The  economic  case  against
taxing  improvements  is  thus  not  decisive.
In  practice,  site  valuation  is  used  in  only  a  small  number  of
countries. Its declining  popularity  is due not to the economic
arguments,  but to the perception  of inequities  on ability-to-pay
grounds. Where  major  office  buildings,  hotels,  and  industrial  plants
dominate  the  landscape,  the temptation  to "tax"  these  structures  has
proven  politically  irresistible.
Defining  the  Numeraire:  Capital  or  Rental  Value
Under a  land-and-improvement  base, property  value  can be
denominated  in  two  ways;  as  annual  rental  value  (ARV)  or  as  capital  or
market  value.  Because  capital  value  is  merely  the  present  value  of  the
discounted  stream  of  expected  returns  from  a property,  there  would  be
little  difference  in  the  allocative  and  distributional  effects  of the
two  alternatives  in  a  static  economy.
In  a  growing  economy,  the  impact  of  the  two  alternatives  would
differ. Because  capital  value  reflects  expected  future  returns,  it
captures  market  expectations  of  future  rent  increases  and  (through  its
land  component)  future  changes  in land  use.  The  prospects  for such
changes  will  vary  between  neighborhoods  and  properties.  The capital
value  definition  will  reflect  these  variations,  placing  a larger  portion
of  the  statutory  burden  of  the  tax  on  properties  where  increasing- 20  -
returns  are  anticipated.  The  annual  rental  value  definition,  reflecting
only  the  current  returns  on property,  will  not  make  this  distinction.
It  is unlikely that this difference in  impact would be
apparent  in  a comparison  of  actual  experience  under  the  two  systems. In
practice,  values  under  both  ARV  and capital  value  systems  borrow  freely
from the techniques  of the opposite  camp.  Elasticities  and land use
impacts  depend  far  more on the  peculiarities  of administration  than on
characteristics  inherent  in either  system. In choosing  between  capital
value  on  ARV,  the  overriding  consideration is  administrative
convenience.  As discussed  in  Section  II.B.,  the  definition  that  is  used
should  be the  one which  exploits  the  best  market  data.  If rental  tenure
is  widespread  and  accurate  rental  data is  readily  available,  ARV should
be used.  If owner-occupancy  is common,  and accurate  data on sales
prices are  readily available,  capital value should be  used.  In
practice,  neither  definit.on  is going to completely  meet the test of
"accurate data,  readily available."  Rent  controls, though not
necessarily  obeyed  in the  market,  distort  the  rental  prices  reported  to
officials  of  government.  High  capital  gains  taxes,  similarly,  result  in
inaccurate  sales  data  reported  to  official  sources.
2.  Rate  Structure  and  Exemption  Policies
Progressive  Rate  Structures
Many  countries employ  progressive rate  structures or
assessment  ratios  in fixing  tax liabilities. Th*ir objective  is to
increase  the progressivity  of the property  tax.  They do so, but
imperfectly.  In most progressive  structure  countries,  the rate is- 21  -
supposed  to  be applied  against  the  aggregate  value  of  all  property  owned
by the taxpayer.  In this way, a  taxpayer  could not avcid a high
progressive  rate  by  maintaining  his  real  estate  holdings  in the  form  of
many small low-value  properties.  This aggregation  of property  has
proven  to be easily  evaded, by registering  properties  under various
family  member  names.  Thus  progressivity  is limited  to the  extent  that
higher  income  groups  own  more  valuable  individual  properties  than  lower
income  groups. (Property  valuation  is,  in  any  case,  a poor  indicator  of
wealth,  as it is based  on gross  property  value,  rather  than  net  equity,
and  ignores  wealth  held  in forms  other  than  real  estate.)
The principal  impact  of progressive  rate structures  is to
create  pressure  for  undervaluation  at the margin  of each tax bracket.
Under the typical  progressive  slab-system,  properties  just over the
boundary  of a given  slab bear  a much  higher  liability  than those  just
below it.  The pressure  resulting  from these disparities  can be
reduced  by  defining  the  rate  structure  as a lineat  equation. While  this
reduces pressures for  undervaluation,  it does not  strengthen the
economic  argument  for  progressive  tax  rates.
Exemptions  for  Smail  Properties
Property  tax  systems  also  often  exempt  low  value  property,  in
an  effort  to improve  progressivity.  Here  again,  the  actual  distribution
impact  is questionable.  Where  small  slum  dwellings  are  owned  by major
landlords  (and  tenancy  contracts  do  not  permit  pass-through  of taxes),- 22 -
the small property  exemption  may  be only a  benefit to individuals
holding  wealth  in  this  form.
An argument  for exempting  small  properties  is also made on
administrative  cost grounds.  Taxes  on low value  property  are said to
cost  more to administer  than they  can  yield  in revenue. This is less
true  than  it  would  appear. Where  property  taxes  are  administered  on the
basis  of  a comprehensive  fiscal  cadastres,  all  properties,  regardless  of
value,  must be mapped, assigned  an identiy  Acation  code, and valued
sufficiently  well  to  identify  those  qualifying  for  exemption. Exempting
low  value  property  thus  only  spares  the  costs  of  billing  and  collection.
Where  small,  low  value  properties constitute a  large
proportion  of the real property  assets  in a city, tar administrators
would  be better  advised  to adopt  extremely  simple  valuation  methods  for
typical  units,  thus bringing  them into the tax system  at the lowest
possible  cost.
Preferential  Assessment  Ratios  for  Home  Ownership
Many  countries permit preferential  rates, or  assessment
ratios, to owner occupied  residential  property.  The rationale  for
preferential  treatment  is either to encourage  home-ownership,  or on
ability-to-pay  grounds (the latter case reflecting  the belief that
because owner-occupied  property  does  not  generate  rental  income,  owner-
occupants  are  less  able  to pay  recurrent  property  taxes). The  merits  of
encouraging  home  ownership  aside,  it  is  unlikely  that  differentials  have
much impact  on tenure  decisions.  This preferential  treatment  does,
however,  represent  a subsidy  to middle  and upper income  groups,  which
account  for  the  bulk  of  owner  occupants  in  LDC's.- 23  -
The  ability-to-pay  agreement is  reminiscent of  ongoing
controversy  in developed  countries. There,  rapidly  rising  urban land
values  have boosted  assessments  on older homes,  occupied  by retired
persons  on limited  income. While  increasingly  "wealthy"  on paper,  these
persons generally  lack the current income to meet rising property
taxes.  It is unlikely  that such  a condition  exists  to  any significant
extent  in LDCs;  however,  and even if so, a blanket  exemption  to all
omier-occupants  is  an expensive  means  of  addressing  this  problem.
Taxation  of Industrial  and  Commercial  Properties
Property  tax policy  gives  exceptional  treatment  to industrial
and commercial  properties  in two ways; either  taxing  it more heavily
than residential  property  (through  higher assessment  ratios or tax
rates); or  by  taxing it  less heavily, through tax  holidays and
concessional  rates.
The  former  practice  is  more  common,  and  appears  to be  based  on
equity  grounds;  i.e.,  that  owners  of business  have greater  ability  to
pay  than  owners  of residential  property. The economic  consequences  of
the  tax  vary  according  to the  churacteristics  of the  business. In the
case  of  producers  of tradeable  goods  which  dominate  the  national  market,
much of the  incidence  of the  property  tax  will  be shifted  forward  onto
consumers  in other  jurisdictions.  If the  business  produces  tradeables
which  do  not  dominate  the  national  market,  it  will  be  borne  in  the  short
term  by  owners;  but  may  be have  wider  repercussions  in  the  long  run.  If
it produces  non-tradeables,  the incidence  will  be shared  between  owners
and local consumers.  Because of  the potential for shifting the
incidence  of the  tax  is  difficult  to  predict,  but  clearly  could  deviate- 24  -
from  the  assumed  by policy  makers,  the  degree  of shifting,  particularly
across jurisdictions,  also suggests  potential  serious  distortions  in
resource  allocation.
Reductions in  tax  burdens for  commercial  and  industrial
property  are generally  made at the behest  of central  governments,  as
part of sectoral  promotion  strategies;  or by a  local  government,  to
attract  new industry. To achieve  these  objectives,  property  taxes  must
constitute  a significant  part  of the  affected  industry's  costs,  and  the
tax break must be significant  and sustained.  In most cases it is
neit'her.  Business  tax  breaks  are  therefore  ineffective  in  meeting  their
allocative  objectives,  but  potentially  very  costly  in terms  of foregone
revenue.
B. Property  Tax  Administration  and  Institutional  Arrangements
The  performance  and  fairness  of property  taxation  depend,  to  a
great extent,  on how well it is administered. The property  tax is
difficult  to  administer  cost  effectively.  It involves  a large  number  of
individual  taxpaying  units,  each yielding  a relatively  small  amount  of
revenue.
The job  is  particularly  difficult  in  LDCs. Due  to rapid  urban
growth  (and  often  high inflation)  the  tax base  is constantly  changing.
Skill  levels  in the taxing  authority  are  generally  low.  In addition,
the  sources  of  information used  to  facilitate property  tax
administration  in developed  countries  are  less  useful  in  LDCs.  Records
of property  transactions,  title  information,  and  building  permits  often
omit  large  segments  of the  urban  property  market.- 25 -
The  key  to successful  administration  is  to adopt  the  system  to
its environment: to the characteristics  of the tax base, the skill
level available,  and the sources of readily accessible  data.  In
general,  this implies  simple  and somewhat  arbitrary  procedures,  and
little  teliance  on interagency  information  sharing.
1.  Developing  Appropriate  Administrat.ve  Procedures
Discovery  and  Identification
The administration  of property  taxes is based  on system  of
property  records,  termed the fiscal  cadastre.  Each record in the
cadastri  contains,  for a specific  property,  (i)  an identifying  number,
permitting  the  record  to be linked  to a parcel  on the  ground;  (ii)  the
data  to be used  in  determining  the  property's  value;  and (iii)  the  data
used for billing  (generally  consisting  of an owner  or occupant's  name
and address). The yield  of the  property  tax  depends  to a great  extent
upon the  completeness  of the  cadastre  (in terms  of  having  a record  for
every  parcel)  and  the  accuracy  of information  contained  on  each  record.
Historically,  many  countries  have  relied  on owner  declarations
to compile their fiscal cadastre.  Legislation  would require all
property  owners to supply  the government  with a  list of properties
owned,  their  location,  and the characteristics  of each property  to be
used  in  determining  their value.  This  approach worked  poorly,
however.  Owners  would submit  incomplete  lists (laying  claim only to
properties where  ownership was  disputed) and  consistently  under
reporting  the  characteristics  to  be  used  in  calculating  value. Most- 26 -
governments  now resort to assembling  their own fiscal cadastre,  by
making  periodic  field  inventories.
The "orthodox"  method  of conducting  such  an inventory  begins
with  preparation  of a base  map  of the  taxing  jurisdiction,  followed  by a
field  survey  to determine  and delineate  the  boundaries  of each parcel.
Detailed  maps showing  parcel boundaries  are then prepared  and each
parcel is assigned an  identificaticn  code.  Data to  be used  in
valuations  is  obtained  during  the  field  survey  and  incorporated  onto  the
property  record.  Billing data is obtained  from a  title or deeds
registry  which  fixes  legal  ownership.
The  standards  of surveying  and  adjudication  that  would  be used
in  industrialized  countries are  inappropriate  to  most  developing
countries,  however. Many  have  cheaper  and simpler  approaches  which  work
reasonably  well. Accurate  parcel  boundary  demarcation,  for  example,  is
not essential  for property  identification  purposes.  Some LDC cities
dispense  with mapping  altogether,  simply  preparing  a list of taxable
properties  identified  by street  address  or (where  street  addresses  are
not adequate)  painting tax identification  numbers directly  on each
building. Where  maps  are  used,  no attempt  is  made to  determine  precise
legal  boundaries;  the  authorities simply  demarcate boundaries
sufficiently  to  distinguish  one  property  from  another.
Similar  compromises  are made in determining  liability. The
use  of title  or  deed  records  to identify  ownership  is impractical  in  LDC
cities.  Ownership  is disputed  on a large proportion  of properties.
Where  not  disputed,  deed  or title  records  are  in  such  a state  as to  make
retrieval  impractical.  LDC  tax  authorities  therefore  forego  any  attempt
to verify  legal  title,  and instead  adopt  what is called  an "owner  of- 27  -
record" approach.  Her',  the  local authority makes  an  informal
determination  of  ownership in  the  course of  its  field  survey.
Compliance  is  encouraged  by  legislation  which  relieves the  local
authority  of any  obligation  to prove  legal  ownership  prior  to imposing
the  tax  (by  specifying  that  the  property  itself  is liable  or  by allowing
the  taxing  authority  itself  to  designate  a presumptive  owner).
Valuation
The purpose  of valuation  for tax purposes  is to provide  the
basis  for  distributing  the  burden  of property  taxes. It is important  to
distinguish  this objective  from the objectives  of valuation  where the
government  intends  to purchase  a private  property  outright.  In the
latter  case, precision  is criticai,  and the valuation  method should
attempt  to produce  an accurate  estimate  of the  current  market  value. In
valuing  property  for  tax  purposes,  only  a measure  of relative  value  at  a
common  point  in time  is  needed. Tax  valuation  can therefore  use  highly
simplified  valuation  methods.  What is essential  in a tax valuation
system  is that it be objective,  so as to produce  legally  defensible
valuations,  and that  the  methodology  be appropriate  to the skill  levels
of the local authority,  and market  information  available  in the  local
jurisdiction.
Value  for  tax  purposes  is generally  denominated  in one  of two
ways:  as annual  rental  value or as capital  (or sales),  value.  The
definition  used in a specific  country  generally  reflects  its colonial
history:  much of Africa  and South  Asia define  value  on the basis  of
rent;  Latin  America  and  East  Asia  define  value  on the  basis  of sales  or
market  value.- 28  -
An practiced  in developing  countries,  annual  rental  valuation
(ARV)  is the  simpler  of the  two  methods. ARV  relies,  wherever  possible,
on direct  market  evidence. To value  rental  property,  the  valuer  merely
requests  rental  data  from  the  occupant. The  valuer  may  be  authorized  to
demand  written  confirmation  (in  the  form  of a rent  receipt)  and  may  have
the  power  to reject  questionable  receipts  and  make a valuation  based  on
his  own knowledge  of the  market.  But  in general,  where  direct  market
evidence  exists,  the  valuer  uses  it.
This rental  valuation  method,  while  simple,  is vulnerable  to
abuse.  Valuations  are not derived  from  observAble  C  raeter1stjes  of
the  property,  but  rather  from  statements  or  written  evidence  provided  by
the  occupant.  This provides opportunities  for  collusion between
landlord  and  tenant  to produce  false  rent  receipts,  or collusion  between
tenants  and  valuers  to  undervalue  the  property  itself.
Owner-occupied properties, obviously,  produce  no  rent
receipts. ARV countries  use  a variety  of alternative  methods  to value
owner-occupied  property. Most often,  valuers  are simply  instructed  to
estimate  values based on comparable  rentals.  This process is as
vulnerable  to  abuse  as  valuations  based  on  direct  market  evidence.
Capital  valuation,  in contrast  to  ARV,  is  of necessity  based
on  objective,  measurable  property  characteristics.  As orly a  small
percentage  of properties  are  actually  sold  in  a given  valuation  period,
the option of using direct market  evidence  as a  basis for valuing
individual  properties  does  not  exist. The  valuer  must instead  devise  a
system  for extrapolating  from the few transactions  that do occur to
calculate  a hypothetical  sales  value  for  each  property.The  first  step- 29 -
in  the  process is  to  assemble and  analyze the  available market
data.121 The valuation  office  begins  by obtaining  data on recent  land
sales,  including  (at the minimum)  the value of the transaction,  the
location  of the  property,  and the  square  footage  involved. By  grouping
the  sales  according  to their  location  within  the  city,  this  provides  the
basis for calculating  the value of  square foot of  land in  each
neighborhood.
The  value  of improvements  can  . estimated  either  on the  basis
of recent  sales,  or based  on depreciated  replacement  cost.  The  latter
approach is more common.  Here, unit costs  for  improvements  are
determined,  first, by defining  typical building types in the city.
Valuation  staff then prepare  estimates  of the construction  cost of a
typical  building  of  each  class,  based  on information  obtained  from  local
construction  firms  and  building  materials  suppliers. Taking  the total
construction  cost,  and dividing  it by the square  footage  assumed  for
each class  of property  yields  an estimate  of the  unit  cost (per  square
foot)  for each type  of building. Further  elaboration  of the  building
cost  table  would  be required  to take  into  account  variations  in  the  age
and  condition  of buildings  to be  valued.
The process  yields  a table  showing  the  value  per square  foot
of land in various  neighborhood,  and the value of per square  foot of
improvements  of various types and conditions.  Inidividual  property
valuations  are  then  calculated  by obtaining  data  on the  physical
12/  The  method  described  here  is  termed  "mass  appraisal."  It is  used
to value  common  classes  of property,  on which  an active  market
exists.  To value  unusual  properties  (such  as large  factories)
valuers  will make more detailed  appraisal  of individual  parcel,
and  may  base their  valuation  on discounted  income  or depreciated
replacement  cost  methods.- 30 -
characteristics  of each property  to be valued,  and  applying  these  unit
costs  to them.
This approach,  while  objective,  is  not simple. Extrapolating
from market evidence to  produce unit cost  tables, in particular,
requires  a higher  degree  of technical  sophistication  than  is available
in  most  local  governments.
Is one definition  of value inherently  better  than another?
Not  necessarily.  What  is important  is  not  how  value  is  denominated,  but
rather whether the methodology  used to derive it is  sound.  The
preponderance  of evidence  from  LDCs  suggests  that  methodologies  relying
on physical  characteristics  are more suitable  to LDC conditions  than
those  based  on direct  market  evidence. Such systems,  however,  require
technical  support  to the agency responsible  for preparing  unit cost
tables.
In choosing  to source  of data to be used in  calculating  unit
cost tables,  the overriding  consideration  should be the quality  of
market  data.  As discussed  earlier,  where  rental  tenure  is common,  or
high taxes  on property  transactions  cause property  sales data to be
understated,  rental  data  may be the  more  reliable  source.  Where  owner
occupancy  is common,  or where rent corAtrols  have driven the rental
market underground,  sales and construction  cost data may  be more
reliable. The source  of  market  data  will  then  determine  whether  value,
for  tax  purposes,  is  denominated  as  ARV  or  capital  value.
Cadastral  Maintenance
The fiscal  cadastre,  once complete,  provides  on estimate  of
the  value  of all  taxable  properties  at a  given  point  in time. To- 31  -
capture  the growth  in the tax base,  a ongoing  system  of cadastral
maintenance  is  required.
Maintenance  of the  fiscal  cadastre  is  needed  to  capture  two
principle  types of  changes.  First are  changes in  property
characteristics.  New  parcels  come  into  existence,  through  subdivision
or annexation.  Ownership  changes,  new  buildings  are  constructed  or
existing  ones  improve.  In  order  to  maintain  comprehensive  tax  coverage,
these  changes  must  be  incorporated  in  the  fiscal  cadastre  on  an  ongoing
basis. In  principle,  most  of these  changes  could  be  flagged  by  other
agencies  of  government.  The  agency  responsible  for  subdivision  approval
could  notify  the tax authority  when new parcels  are created;  the
registrar  of  deeds  could  notify  it  of  changes  in  ownership;  the  building
permits  agency  could  flag  new  construction.  Many  LDC  property  tax  codes
call  for  this  form  of  information  pooling.  As  a  maintenance  technique,
it is not notably  successful.  Many  such  changes  occur  outside  the
formal  system:  land  is  subdivided  illegally,  construction  is  undertaken
without  permits.  Even where formal  procedures  are followed,  the
agencies  concerned  attach  a  low  priority  to  furnishing  this  information
to  the  tax  authorities.  Successful  maintenance  is  instead  a  matter  of
maintaining  a  permanent  staff  whose  responsibility  is  to  monitor  changes
in  property  characteristics  by  ongoing  visual  inspection.
The second  category  of maintenance  involves  changes  in
price. In  principle,  changes  in  prices  need  not  concern  the  valuation
office.  Where  inflation  increases  the  cost  of  providing  local  services,
the  office  can merely  increase  the tax rate  to generate  additional
revenues.  As long  as  relative  property  values  remain  unchanged,  the
burden  of  the  property  tax  would  continue  to  be  distributed  equitably.
Some  countries,  notably  the  U.K.,  follow  this  approach.  Over  time  this- 32  -
results  in  extremely  high  nominal  tax  rates.  (In  England,  the  tax  rate
is  based on prices  of  1972, and exceeds  200 percent  in most
jurisdictions.)
Countries  have  found  it  more  politically  expedient  to  instead
increase  valuations  and  hold  nominal  tax  rates  more  or less  constant.
The traditional  approach  to increasing  valuations  entails  a physical
reinspection  of each  property,  generally  at fixed  intervals  of five
years.  This  approach  is  not  appropriate  for  countries  with  significant
inflation,  however. Five  year intervals  between  revaluations  would
result  in  four  years  of  declining  real  revenues,  followed  by  extremely
abrupt  (and  politically  hazardous)  incretases  in  nominal  valuations  in
the  fifth year.  More frequent  general  revaluatioas  would be
unacceptably  costly,  however. Countries  affected  by inflation  have
evolved  a  more  cost  effective  means  of  adjusting  values.  Rather  than
physically  reinspecting  all  properties,  the  valuation  authorities  adjust
valuations  according  to a  price index.  In Brazil,  for example,
municipal  governments  are  authorized  to  adjust  property  valuations  up  to
the level of the inflation  index for government  bonds,  without
physically  reinspecting  properties.  In Colombia,  values  may be
automatically  increased  by  50-90  percent  of  the  increase  in  the  consumer
price  index  in  the  preceeding  year.-3/ Some  local  governments  in  the
U.S.  automatically  adjust  land  values  based  on  year-to-year  comparisons
of  the  average  sales  price  of  vacant  land  in  their  jurisdictions,  and
adjust  building  valuations  using  regional  construction  cost  indexes.
13/  In  principle,  this  adjustment  is  to  be  based  on  the  results  of  a
special  property  market  survey  carried  out  by  the  national
statistical  agency.- 33  -
General revaluations,  involving  physical  inspection  of all
taxable  properties  must  be  undertaken  at  periodic  intervals.  Physical
inspection  is needed  to flag  minor  changes  in property  characteristics
(such  as building  deterioration,  or minor  improvements),  not discovered
in  the  course  of  regular  cadastral  maintenance.  A recalculation  of unit
co;ts is needed to flag changes in the relative  price of land in
different  locations. Failure  to  periodically  reinspect  will eventually
produce intolerable  inequities  in the distribution  of property  tax
burden.  Such  changes are  gradual, however, and  permit general
revaluations  to be scheduled  at fairly  long  intervals.
Billing  and  Collection
The production  of revenue  ultimately  depends  on effective
system  of billing  and collection. This aspect  of property  tax
administ:ation  is  often  overlooked  in  favor  of  reforms  in  the  discovery
and  valuation  system.  Such  "upstream"  improvements  do  not  necessarily
produce  increased  revenues  unless  complementary  improvements  in the
billing  and  collection  system  are  made.
The  objective  of a billing  system  is to fulfill  the  taxing
authority's  legal  obligation  to  notify  the  taxpayer  of  his  liability.
Success  depends  as  much  on  the  legal  definition  of  liability  as  it  does
on the  mechanics  of producing  and  delivering  the  bill. As discussed
earlier,  the  legal  definition  of liability  should  relieve  the  taxing
authority  of any obligation  to prove  legal  ownership. Instead,  it
should  permit  the  taxing  authority  to impose  non-compliance  penalties
against  the property  itself  or against  the property's  presumptive
owner. Provided  the  penalties  are  enforced,  whoever  is  in  beneficial
occupation  of  the  property  should  be  induced  to  comply.- 34  -
Where  these  legal  definitions  are used. the mechanics  of
billing  consist  either  of posting  the list  of assessments  in a public
place (a common  practice  in small towns)  or attaching  a bill to the
physical  premises  of each  property  (without  concern  for  whether  the  bill
has  been  received  by an  owner).
Collection  improvement  is  complicated,  as it  involves  a  mix  of
administrative,  legal,  and political  constraints. As a general  rule,
successful  collection  depends  on making  compliance  convenient,  and  non-
compliance  subject  to  swift,  certain,  and  costly  penalties.
Collection  can be made more convenient  by decentralizing  it.
Many LDC local governments  still  require  property  tax payments  to be
made in person  at city hall.  This entails  long travel  and lengthy
waiting.  Collection  can  instead be  decentralized  to neighborhood
collection  points  (as now done in Calcutta,  India)  or to branches  of
commercial  banks  (as  in  Karachi,  Pakistan).  Collection  can  also  be  made
more convenient  by permitting  tax  payments  to be made in quarterly  or
semi-annual  installments.
Penalties  can  be made  more  certain  by improving  the  system  for
recording  payment.  In many municipalities,  tax payments  are simply
recorded  on individual  taxpayer  records,  and  filed. Given  the  thousands
of property records in a medium sized city, this system  makes it
difficult  to identify  and track  major  delinquents. In the  Philippines,
the gowernment  proposes  to address  this problem  by encouraging  local
governments  to create  a specific  delinquent  accounts  unit.  The unit
would identify  major delinquent  accounts  and  monitor  the execution  of
the sequence  of administrative  and legal  enforcement  measures  provided
for  by law.- 35  -
Penalties  for  delinquency  need  to  be  severe  enough  to  induce
compliance.  The most widely  used  penalties  are not.  Most taxing
authorities  impose  a one-time  penalty  for  late  payment  followed  by  an
interest  charge  applied  as long  as the  bill  is outstanding.  These
interest  charges  are often  lower  than  the rate  paid  on savings  in
commercial  banks,  however. Taxpayers  thus  have  an incentive  to  bank
their  tax  liability,  and  delay  payment  for  as  long  as  possible.
Most  countries  have  more  serious  penalties  on  the  books,  but
rarely  use them.  Nearly  all countries  legally  authorize  the  taxing
authority  to seize  and sell  delinquent  property  for non-payment  of
taxes.  This  penalty,  if enforced,  would  certainly  be effective,  as
property values usually exceed the  value of  outstanding  tax
liabilities.  The  auctioning  penalty  is  rarely  used. Often  cases  never
reach  the  auction  stage  because  tbey  are  tied  up  in  legal  disputes.  In
West  Bengal,  for  example,  a spurious  challenge  to  a property  valuation
is sufficient  to forestall  auction  proceedings  for  seven  years.  In
Anambra  State,  Nigeria,  cases  have  been  dismissed  for  lack  of  judges  to
try the  cases.  West  Bengal  has  recently  addressed  this  problem  by
requiring  taxpayers  to  pay  the  amount  in  dispute  prior  to  filing  suit,
subject  to refunding  if the taxpayer's  case is vindicated. This
discourages  spurious  suits,  and  gives  the  local  government  the  use  of
the  money  in  the  mean  time. In  Anambra,  legal  proceedings  were  hastened
by shifting  their  venue  from the formal  magistrate  courts  to the
customary  courts.- 36 -
2. Improving  Institutional  Arran8ements
Although  municipal  governments  are  the  ultimate  recipients  of
urban property  tax revenues,  various  stages  of property  taxation  are
often assigned  to higher levels  of government.  Property  tax reform
efforts  in  LDC's  often  look  to  reassignments  of  institutional
responsbilities  as vehicles  for  improving  the  tax's  performance.
Existing  Institutional  Arrangements
Existing  institutional  arrangements  for property  taxation  can
be  grouped  into  four  categories,  as illustrated  in  Table  3.
Completely  decentralized.  Here,  all  three  of the  major  stages
of  property taxation--discovery  and  valuation,  policy setting,  and
billing and collection--are  the responsibility  of local government.
This pattern prevails in  the U.S. and  Japan.  It  is rare among
developing  countries,  occurring  only in Brazil  and in Ibadan,  Nigeria,
among  the  locations  supplying  data.14/
Completely  centralized. In this  model,  the three  stages  are
assigned to  central government,  which then transfers  the  revenues
collected  to the local level.  France  employs  this approach,  as do
Indonesia  and Senegal.  Pakistan  and Mexico,  using  a variant  of this
arrangement,  assign  the  three  stages to  intermediate  levels of
14/  In theory,  it  is  also  found  in  India,  the  Philippines,  and  some
large  cities  of  Kenya. In  practice,  central  government  controls
over  tax  policy  render  local  autonomy  over  this  aspect  of
property  taxation  meaningless.  These  cases  are  therefore
included  in  the  "central  policy,  local  administration"  group.- 37 -
governmnts (provinces  and  states,  respectively)  which  then  transfer  the
proceeds  of the  tax  to local  governments.
Taole  3:  INSTITUTIONAL  ARRANGEMENTS  FOR  PROPERTY  TAXATION
Institutional  Industrial  Country Develcping  rountry
Arrangement  Examples  Examples
Completely  decentralized  U.S.,  Japan  Brazil;  lbadan,  Nigeria
Completely  centralized  Prance  Indonesih Senegal/
Pakistan-L,  Mexico-
Central  policy,  local  Korea,  Philippi7gs8
administration  India;  Colombial-,
Kenya-
Divided  administration
-central  valuation,  /c
local  collection  U.K.,  W. Germany  Colombia-t,  Keny,-
Anambra,  Nigeria-a
-local  valuation,
central  collection  Netherlands  Tunisia;  /
Lagos,  Nigeria/a
/a  state  or provincial  level  performs  central  function
7T  larger  cities  only
/c  smaller  cities  only
Central  policy,  local  administration.  Here,  local  governments
are responsible  for the administrative  aspects  of property  taxation--
discovery,  valuation,  billing  and collection--while  central  government
retains  control  over policy. This  arrangement  exists  de jure  in Korea
and  in large  cities  in  Colombia,  and  de facto  (given  central  government
rate  ceilings  and  rights  of  prior  reviev)  in  India,  the  Philippines,  and
large  cities  in  Kenya.- 38  -
Divided  administration. In this last group,  responsibility
for the  administrative  aspects  of property  taxation  are  divided  between
central  and  local  government.  In one  variant,  the  central  government  is
responsible  for discovery and  valuation and  local governments  are
responsible  for billing  and collection. This arrangement  prevails  in
the U.K., Germany,  and in smaller  cities  in Colombia  and Kenya.  In
Anambra State, Nigeria, the  state government  performs the central
valuacion  role.  The reverse  administrative  arrangement  is also used.
In the Netherlands  and Tunisia,  local  governments  are responsible  for
valuation,  and the  central  government  for billing  and collection. The
assignment  of policy-making  power  cuts  across  the  two  variants. In  all
three industrial  countries  cited  above,  local  governments  are able to
fix tax rates  and exemption  policies. In the  four developing  country
cases,  this  power  is  restricted  by the  central  government.
Reallocating  Administrative  Responsibilities
Whether  the administrative  aspects  of property  taxation  are
better  performed  by central  or local  government  is a matter  of debate.
The choice  can be characterized  as a tradeoff  between  the incompetence
of local  government  and  the  indifference  of central  authorities.
Local  governments, it  is  argued,  are  incapable of
administering  the property  tax  accurately  and honestly. According  to
this  view,  valuation  is  too  technically  demanding  for  local  governments,
given the limited  skills  available  to them.  Local vulnerability  to
political  pressure  precludes  objective  valuation  and  vigorous  collection
enforcement. Only central  governments  enjoy sufficient  economies  of
scale to develop technical  expertise  in valuation  and only central- 39  -
governments  are sufficiently  insulated  from  local  political  pressure  to
value  properties  with technical  competence  and to enforce  collection
with  impartiality.
Experience with  central administration  has  not  been  an
unqualified  success,  however.  Because  urban property  taxes  yield  no
direct revenue to central governments  (and constitute  only a  small
proportion  of the resources  of the public  sector  as a whole)  central
governments are  often  indifferent  to  the  quality of  the  tax's
administration.  Staffing allocations to  property valuation are
inadequate.  Collection  enforcement  receives  a lower  priority  than  that
assigned  to the central  government's  own taxes.  Central  governments
have also not  proven immune to political influences  on  the tax's
administration.  In  light of  this experience,  advocates of local
administration  make the following  argument:  that  only the jurisdiction
that  ultimately  receives  the  revenue  has  a sufficient  vested  interest  in
the  tax's  administration  to ensure  that  the  job  is  done  well. According
to this  view,  both valuation  and collection  should  be decentralized  to
the  local  level.
In  practice,  both  centralized  and  decentralized  administration
have succeeded  in some  instances  and failed  in others. The  assignment
of this  responsibility,  by itself,  does  not  appear  to guarantee  either
outcome.
Efforts  to reform  the  institutional  arrangements  for  property
taxation  must  address  the  respective  weaknesses  of  whichever  arrangement
is ultimately  selected.  In this respect,  the incompetence  of local
government  appears  to be more  easily  mitigated  than  the indifference  of
central  authorities. If  administration  is decentralized,  the  technical- 40  -
weakness  of local  government  can  be addressed  through  centrally-managed
technical  assistance  programs.  (Two such programs  are described  in
Section  III.)  Specific  technical  problems  (such  as the calculation  of
unit cost tables  and inflation  adjustment  factors  or the  valuation  of
unique structures  such as factories)  can be assigned  to a technical
agency  of the central  government.  The political  pressures  on local
assessors and  treasurers  can  be  mitigated through civil  service
protection. (The  Philippines  'ias  taken  the further  step  of making  the
Ministry  of  Finance  responsible for  recruiting, promoting and
disciplining  local assessors and treasurers.)  Central or regional
boards can be established  to review the technical  merits of  local
government  valuations.
Reassigning  Control  over  Tax  Policy
There is a strong  efficiency  argument  for permitting  local
governments  to control  the  instruments  of tax policy,  particularly  tax
rates  (and  assessment  ratios,  inflation  adjustments,  and the  scheduling
of revaluations,  to the  extent  these  also  determine  the  effective  level
of property  taxation).  Where  local  governments  control  tax  rates,  they
are in  a position  to  adjust  the  level  of municipal  expenditure  to  match
the  preferences  of local  taxpayers.  A close  match  between  local  service
levels and  taxpayer preferences  implies an  optimal allocation  of
resources  between  the production  of municipal  services  and all other
production.
Taxpayer  preferences  for  municipal  services  are  likely  to  vary
between  jurisd,ctions,  reflecting  differences  in  average  income  levels,
taste",  aud  service  production  costs.  Uniform  national  tax rates  are- 41 -
therefore likely to  result in  an  overallocation  of  resources to
municipal  services in some jurisdictions,  and an underallocation  of
resources  to municipal  services  in others. While central  governments
could, in principle,  vary the tax  rates they impose in different
jurisdictions  to match  the  preferences  of local  taxpayers,  in practice
they  are  in a poor  position  to  do so.  Local  governments  would  appear  to
have a clear comparative  advantage  in discerning  the preferences  of
their  constituencies.
Local control  over tax rates  is,  however,  largely  limited  to
industrial  countries.  In  most  developing  countries,  central  governmernts
control  local  tax rates,  either  directly  or in the  form of ceiling  on
maximum  rates.  In rare  cases,  this  control  may  be justified  by central
government's  need to control  the instruments  of macroeconomic  policy.
Given  the  property tax's  small  role  in  public  sector resource
mobilizationz5/  this  argument  is  not  persuasive.
III. TAX  REFORM  PROGRAMS: DESIGN  AND  IMPLEMENTATION
Efforts to improve property  taxation  rarely begin with a
tabula  rasa.  Almost  all market-economy  countries  have some form of
property  taxation  already  in  place. The  job  of reform  is  to improve  the
performance  of an existing  system.  The process  of reform  must begin
with a  careful diagnosis  of the weaknesses  of  the present system.
Beyond  this,  specifics  will vary.  Experience  with property  tax reform
in  LDCs  nevertheless  provides  some  broad  guidelines  for  the  process.
15/  Based  on  data  from  55  developing  countries,  the  IMF  reports  that
recurrent  taxes  on imuovable  property  constitute  an  average  of
1.3  percent  of total  public  sector  taxation.- 42 -
A.  Quick  Fixes
The  yield  of the  urban  property  tax  is the  combined  product  of
a sequence  of four factors:  the completeness  of the fiscal  cadastre,
the level and accuracy  of  valuations,  the tax  rate and  exemption
schedule,  and the efficiency  of collections.  Efforts to reform  a
deteriorated  property  tax  system  often  start  at the  beginning  with  a new
fiscal  cadastre. Unless  equal  effort  is  devoted  to improving  collection
efficiency  and increasint  tax rates,  much of the effort devoted to
fiscal  cadastre  is  wasted  however. Newly  discovered,  or newly  revalued
properties  yield  no revenue  if collections  are  not  enforced. They  yield
twice  as  much  revenue  if  the  tax  rate  is  doubled.
This  suggests,  as a general  rule,  that  the search  for targets
of  reform should begin at  the  end  of  the  taxation process--at
collection--and  work  backward. This results  not  only in  more  efficient
use  of effort  but  a considerably  earlier  increase  in  revenues.
Collection  efficiency  is  a  good  first  target. Sorting  payment
records to  identify major delinquents,  combined with  conspicuous
enforcement  of penalties,  can produce  a  major one-time increase  in
collections  on  arrears. Introduction  of financial-  reporting  systems  for
collections,  and sustained  commitment  to enforcement  can result  in a
sustained  increase  in collection  efficiency. An increase  in tax rate
will increase  liabi'ities  in the next tax  ycar,  and is a good second
target  for  reform.
These  solutions, in  effect,  increase collections from
properties  already  on the  tax  rolls  increasing  liabilities  in proportion
to existing valuations.  Where the  fiscal cadastre is reasonably
complete,  and  the valuations  still valid in relative  terms, these- 43  -
measures  are tolerable. Where these  conditions  do not exist,  simple
increases  in rate and collection  efficiency  will exaggerate  whatever
inequities  were already  in existence. In this case,  more fundamental
reform  is  necessary.
B.  Fundamental  Reform
Achieving  fundamental  reform  an a  national  scale  is  difficult,
particularly  where  property  tax  administration  is  decentralized.  The
experience  of two such  efforts,  in the Philippines  and Brazil,  provide
lessons  for  other  countries  facing  similar  problems.
1.  Philippines  Real  Property  Tax  Administration  (RPTA)
Project
The Philippines  is a  lower-middle  income country,  with a
population  of roughly  54 million.  The government  is organized  as a
unitary  state,  with the local  tier of government  comprised  of 61 city
governments  and  1550 municipalities  (the latter incorporating  small
towns  and their  surrounding  rural  hinterland).  The property  tax is  one
of two tax bases  assigned  to local  government,  and is supplemented  by
intergovernmental  recurrent  transfers.
Responsibility  for the discovery  and valuation  of property
rests  with the  local  assessor. The local  treasurer  is responsible  for
billing  and collection. The central  government,  however,  retains  the
authority  to  fix assessment  ratios and maximum tax rates, to  set
exemption  policies,  and  to determine  the  date  on which  general  property
revaluations  become  effective.- 44  -
Prior  to the  RPTA project,  the  property  discovery  process  was
based  upon  owner  declarations.  Property  owners  were  required  to submit
periodic  statements  to local  assessors,  declaring  the properties  under
their ownership  and providing  basic  data on each property's  physical
characteristics. Valuations  were calculated  using a mass appraisal
technique:  standard  unit  cost  factors,  calculated  by the  assessor,  were
applied  to the  descriptive  data  supplied  by property  owners  to yield  an
estimate  of each property's  value.  This  procedure  permitted  two  forms
of evasion:  property  owners  could  either  understate  the  characteristics
of their  properties,  or they  could  neglect  to declare  their  properties
entirely.
The  RPTA  project  was  designed  to  eliminate  these
opportunities.  It intended  to do so by fundamentally  changing  the
procedure used  to  discover property, from  one  based  on  owner
declarations  to  one  based  on field-verified  inventories  of properties,  a
procedure  termed  "tax  mapping".
This conversion  of systems  was accomplished  by special  tax
mapping  teams,  recruited  and led by the local  assessor. The work of
each  team  comprised  three  phases:
- the prefield  tie-up,  where the  RPTA team compiled  a working
parcellary  map of the jurisdiction,  drawing  on whatever  maps
and cadastral  records  were available,  and then  matched  owner
declarations  to  mapped  parcels  as far  as  data  permitted;- 45  -
- field  work,  where undeclared  parcels  were identified  and
mapped,  and  property  characteristics  were  noted  for  purposes
of  valuation;  and
- post  field  work,  where  a final  parcellary  map  was  prepared;
valuations  were calculated,  and an assessment  roll was
prepared  and sent  to the  treasurer's  department  for  billing
and  collection.
Central  administrative  support  to  the  project  was  provided  by
the Ministry  of  Finance.  Initially,  this support  was largely
financial.  RPTA  provided  partial  funding  for  contractual  and  casual
labor;  vehicles,  equipment,  and  supplies;  and  incremental  staff  travel
costs.  As MOF gained  experience  with  the  program,  its  capacity  to
provide  technical  backup increased,  although  staffing  constraints
remained  a  problem.
In  terms  of  its  specific  objectives,  RPTA  was  a  near-success.
The project  aimed  to complete  the  tax  mapping  process  in 800 local
jurisdictions  over  a five  year  period.  It  achieved  70  percent  of  that
target. While  the  number  of undeclared  properties  turned  out to  be
smaller  than  expected  (increasing  total  assessed  valuation  by  only  seven
percent),  the  revaluation  of properties  using  on field-verified  data
increased  assessments  by  an  average  of  28  percent.
But  RPTA's  impact  on  actual  tax  revenues  was  negligible.  The
absolute  level  of  tax  liabilities  remained  extremely  low  (increasing  by
an  average  of  US$2.68  per  parcel).  Actual  collections  increased  by  only
1.1  percent.- 46  -
This is in large  part because  the project's  scope  was too
narrow. While  reforming  the  system  of property  discovery,  RPTA  did  not
address other  problems in  the  tax.  The  absolute level of  tax
liabilities  remained  low in part because  the project  did not address
widespread  underestimation  of  unit costs.  RPTA also declined to
confront the  central government policies which  severely constrain
yields:  It is estimated  that centrally-decreed  postponements  of the
most recent  general  revaluation,  combined  with limits  on tax  rates  and
assessment  ratios,  reduce  the  effective  rate  of property  taxation  in  the
Philippines  to less than 0.2 percent.  Collections  remained  stagnant
because  RPTA did not  address  problems  in collection  administration  and
enforcement. In many jurisdictions,  declines  in collection  efficiency
more  than  offset  increases  in  assessments.
16/
2.  Brazil's  Project  Ciata'--
Brazil  is a middle  income  country,  with a population  of 130
million  (1985). The  government  struct-nre  is federal,  with the  national
territory  divided  among 22 states.  States  are further  divided into
municipios. Totalling  about  4000,  the  municipios  are the  only  form  of
local  government  in  Brazil,  and  incorporate  both  urban  and  rural  areas.
Like  the  Philippines,  Brazil assigns two  tax  bases  to
municipal  government,  one of which is a tax  on urban  property. Local
tax  revenues  are  supplemented  by intergovernmental  recurrent  transfers.
-----------------------------------
16/  Convenio  de Incentivo  ao Aperfeicoamento  Tecnico-
Administrativo  das  Municipalidades.- 47  -
Responsibility  for  all  aspects  of property  tax  administration-
-discovery,  valuation,  billing and  collection--lies  with municipal
officials.  Brazilian  municipalities  also  have s  antial  autonomy  over
property  tax  policy. While  the  central  government  defines  the  tax  base,
local officials  have the authority  to fix tax rates and exemption
policies,  and  to schedule  revaluations  and  inflation  adjustments  without
prior  approval  by higher  levels  of  government.
Unlike the Philippines,  Brazil  had a  workable  framework  for
property  tax administration  before  the  CIATA  program  began.  Discovery
was  based  on field-verified  inventories,  with  properties  recorded  on tax
maps for purposes  of permanent  identification.  Values  were calculated
on the basis of objective  physical  characteristics  and standard  unit
cost factors.  The legal  framework  for billing  and collection  defined
liability  broadly  and provided  ample  means of collection  enforcement.
The problem,  as perceived  by the Brazilian  government,  lay in the
execution  of  these  procedures.  Particularly  in small  jurisdictions,  tax
maps and property  information  were out  of date;  unit cost  factors  were
inaccurate;  and  billing  and  collection  procedures,  haphazard.
The  government's  solution--paralleling  that  of  the
Philippines--was  to  address  the  problem  through  a short  term  injection
of  manpower,  supplies,  and  equipment.  CIATA's  objective,  as  defined  by
Government,  was  to  use  these  inputs  to  produce,  in  each  participating
municipality,  a  complete  and  up-to-date  set  of all  the documents
required to  administer the  property tax.  The  CIATA  "product"
encompassed:- 48 -
- an  updated  municipal  tax  code;
- an updated  tax  map, incorporating  recently  urbanized  areas;
- a new  set  of  property  records,  containing  updated  information
on the  characteristics  of  each  property  in  the  jurisdiction;
- new unit cost tables,  permitting  the revised  property
characteristics  data  to  be  converted  to  estimates  of  value  at
current  market  prices;
- a  new  assessment  roll,  specifying  the  assessed  value  of  each
property  and  its  current  tax  liability;
- a  complete  set  of  tax bills, incorporating  the new
assessments;  and
- a  ledger  for  recording  payments  against  outstanding
liabilities.i7/
17/  CIATA  also  offers  several  computerization  options.  Prior  to  the
widespread  availability  of  microcomputers  in  Brazil,  CIATA  would
maintain  municipalities'  property  records  at  its regional
headquarters,  updating  them  on  the  basis  of  data  supplied  by  the
municipal  assessor,  and  providing  municipalities  with  a set  of
printed  tax  bills  each  year,  (incorporating  updated  property  data
and  any  changes  in  tax  rate). As  the  use  of  microcomputers  has
expanded,  CIATA  now supports  decentralized  records  maintenance
and  billing,  by  assisting  local  government  to  install  systems  on
site. The  use  of  microcomputers  also  permits  collections  to  be
recorded  and  monitored  electronically  (a process  that  was not
possible  under the previous  centralized  system,  due to the
difficulty  of sending  collections  data to CIATA's  regional
headquarters.)  The  use  of microcomputers  supercedes  the last
three  products  of  the  standard  CIATA  package  referred  to  in  the
tezt.- 49 -
CIATA's central administrative  agency, SERPRO, played an
active  role  in  project execution, in  contrast to  the  limited
participation  of central  administretion  in the Philippines  case.  Each
municipal  subproject  was led by a SERPRO  staff,  assigned  full-time  to
the subproject  and remaining  on-site  throughout  subproject  execution.
Standarized "packages" of  technical materials (model  tax  codes,
procedures  manuals  for tax mapping  and valuation,  specific  guidelines
for  subproject  execution)  were  developed  early  in  the  project  and  widely
usea.
CIATA's impact  on tax revenues  was immediate  and dramatic;
again,  a contrast  to the  Philippines'  experience. in percentage  terms,
property  tax revenues  increased  by an average  of 95 percent  in real
terms  ir  the  first  year  following  subproject  implantation.  Much  of this
increase  was due to the incorporation  of recently  urbanized  land and
recent construction  onto the tax rolls.  Collection  efficiency  also
improved  somewhat.-8/ Absolute  levels  of tax liability  per property
remained  low, however,  as municipal  officials  used their  autonomy  over
property  tax policy  to reduce  nominal  tax rates.  Evidence  from the
earliest  CIATA  projects  suggests  that its impact  on revenues  is also
short-lived.  Nominal tax collections  in CIATA municipalities  have
increased  more  slowly than  in  similar non-CIATA  municipalities.
Officials  of the program  report  that they have received  requests  to
repeat the  CIATA  process in  some of  the  earliest participating
municipalities.
18/  Part  of this  improvement  may,  however,  reflect  a  one-time  receipt
of payment  on  arrears.- so  -
3. Design  *nd  Implementation  Lessons
As models  for  the  design  and  implementation  of property  tax
reform  programs,  the  experience  of these  two  programs  yields  several
lessons.
Reforms  should  be based  on a  comprehensive  view of the
problem. RPTA's  limited  impact  on tax  revenues  largely  reflects  its
exclusive  concentration  on  the discovery  phase of  property  tax
administration,  and its  neglect  of central  government  policies  which
constrain  the absolute  level  of property  tax liabilities.  CIATA's
comparative  success in  increeting  revenues  is  partly due  its
comprehensive  coverage  of  tax  administration  (and  the  absence  of  central
government  constraints  on  yields).
Administrative  reform  should  aim  at permanent  procedural
change,  particularly  in  maintenance  systems.  CIATA's  short-lived  impact
in part reflects  a  failure  to implant  a  successful  system  for
incorporating  changes  in property  characteristics  into the fiscal
cadastre.
"PaMcaed"  technical  materials  and  on-site  technical  support
speed  implementation.  The  rate  of  subproject  completion  under  CIATA  far
exceeded  that  of RPTA.19/ This appears  to reflect  CIATA's  early
provision  of standardized  forms,  codes  and  procedures  manuals,  and  the
presence  of an experienced  project  leader  on site  throughout  CIATA
subproject  implementation.
19/  Details  of  the implementation  experience  are provided  in
References  4  and  5.- 51  -
The  need  for selectiviLy  in the choice  of pjrticipating
jurisdictions.  RPTA's  initial  dolays  were  also  attributable  to  its  open
enrollment  policy. The absencq  in some  localities  of adequate  base
conditions  (such  as  a  sufficient  number  of  taxable  properties  to  justify
project  mobilization  costs)  and disputes  over local  obligations  to
provide  in-kind  support  (office  space,  clerical  personnel)  deLayed  many
RPTA  subprojects.  CIATA's  more  elaborate  selection  process  precluded
most  of  such  delays.  But  CIATA's  own  short-lived  impact  is  itself  the
result  of a lack  of selectivity.  The failure  of municipalities  to
sustain  the impact  of CIATA  subprojects  is as much due to lack  of
political  will as to an absence  of technical  procedures. While
political  commitment  is  difficult  to  measure  a priori,  a  greater  effort
to  distinguish  those  municipalities  where  the  conditions  for  sustained
tax  effort  exists  might  have  produced  a  longer  lasting  result.- 52  -
PEFERENCES
1.  Bahl,  Roy  and  Johannes Linn.  1988.  Urban Public Finance
and  Administration  in  Less  Developed  Countries  (draft).
2,  Dillinger,  William. 1988.  "Urban  Property  Tax  Reform,  the  Case  of
the Philippines'  Real Property  Tax Aiministration  Project,"  INU
Discussion  Paper.
3.  Dillinger,  William. 1988.  "Urban  Property  Tax Reform,  the  Case  of
Brazil's  Project  CIATA"  (draft).PPR  Working  Paper  Series
Title  Author  Date  Contact
WPS18  China's  Vocational  and  Technical
Training  Harold  Noah  June  1988  W.  Ketema
John  Middleton  33651
'PS19 Cote  d'lvoire's  Vocational  and
Technical  Education  Christiaan  Grootaert  June  1988  R.  Vartanian
34678
WPS20  Imports  and  Growth  in  Africa  Ramon  Lopez  June  1988  61679
VInod  Thomas
WPS21  Effects  of  European  VERs  on Japanese
Autos  Jaime  de Melo  June  1988  S.  Fallon
Patrick  Messerlin  61680
WPS22  Methodological  Problems  in  Cross-
Country  Analyses  of Economic  Growth  Jean-Paul  Azam  June  1988  E.  Zamora
Patrick  Guillaumont  33706
Sylviane  Guillaumont
WPS23  Cost-Effective  Integration  of
Immunization  and  Basic  Health  Services
In  Developing  Countries:  The  Problem
of Joint  Costs  A.  Mead  Over,  Jr.  July  1988  N.  Jose
33688
WPS24  World  Bank  Investments  in  Vocational
Education  and  Training  John  Middleton  July  1988  W. Ketema
Terri  Demsky  33651
WPS25  A  Comparison  of  Alternative  Training
Modes  for  Youth  in  Israel:  Results
from  Longitudinal  Data  Adrian  Ziderman  July  1988  W.  Ketema
33651
WPS26  Changing  Patterns  in  Vocational
Education  John  Middleton  July  1988  W.  Ketema
33651
WPS27  Family  Background  and  Student
Achievement  Marlaine  E. Lockheed  July  1988  R.  Rinaldi
Bruce  Fuller  33278
Ronald  Nyirongo
WPS28  Temporary  Windfalls  and  Compensation
Arrangements  Bela  Balassa  June  1988  N.  Campbell
33769PPR Working  Paper  Series
Title  Author  Date  Contact
WPS29  The  Relative  Effectiveness  of
Single-Sex  and  Coeducational  Schools
in  Thailand  Emmanuel  Jlmenez  August  1988  T.  Hawkins
Marlaine  E.  Lockheed  33678
WPS30  The  Adding  Up  Problem  Bela  Balassa  July  1988  N.  Campbell
33769
WPS31  Public  Finance  and  Economic  Development  Bela  Balassa  August  1988  N.  Campbell
33769
WPS32  Municipal  Development  Funds  and
Intermediaries  Kenneth  Davey  July  1988  R.  Blade-Chare
33754
WPS33  Fiscal  Policy  in  Commodity-
Exporting  LDCs  John  Cuddington  July  1988  R.  Blade-Charest
33754
WPS34  Fiscal  Issues  in  Macroeconomic
Stabilization  Lance  Taylor
WPS35  Improving  the  Allocation  end  Manage-
ment  of Public  Spending  Stephen  Lister  August  1988  R. Blade-Charest
33754
WPS36  Means  and Implications  of  Social
Security  Finance  in  Developing
Countries  Douglas  J.  Puffert  August  1988  R.  Blade-Charest
33754
WPS37  Black  Market  Premia,  Exchange  Rate
Unification  and Inflation  in
Sub-Saharan  Africa  Brian  Pinto  July  1988  R.  Blade-Charest
33754
WPS38  Intergovernmental  Grants  in
Developing  Countries  Larry  Schroeder
WPS39  Fiscal  Policy  in  Low-income  Africa  Stephen  A.  O'Connell  July  1988  R.  Blade-Chares
33754
WPS40  Financial  Deregulation  and  the
Globalization  of  Capital  Markets  Eugene  L.  Versluysen  August  1988  R.  Blade-Chares
33754
WPS41  Urban  Property  Taxation  in
Developing  Countries  William  Dillinger  August  1988  R.  Blade-Chares
33754